STANTON vs. LELAND.

Imagine the judge to be before you, his eye upon you, yours upon
his, your words addressed to his ears, and mould your speech accordingly. Set your case fairly and fully before him, bringing out all
that substantially and truly tells in your client's favor; avoid all
claptraps, all mere flowers of rhetoric, and talk as one intelligent
intellect addresses itself to another whom it seeks to convince or to
persuade. On such an occasion a jury speech is worse than
wasted.
E.W.C.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Court of Common Pleas of the State of New -Fork.
CORYDON STANTON

vs.

SIMEON LELAND AND WARREN LELAND.
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1. The liability of an innkeeper extends to money stolen from the trunk of a guest.
2. Where the guest, having packed his luggage for departure, locks his room, gives
notice thereof to a clerk, and leaves the key of the room with such clerk, at the
office; the innkeeper will be responsible for money stolen from a trunk, although
a notice may have been brought to the knowledge of the guest, requiring money
and valuables to be placed in a safe at the office, during his sojourn at the inn.
3. An innkeeper, being responsible for the safe keeping of such goods, property,
and money in packages, as the guest brings with him to the inn, can rightfully
require permission to take the actual custody of money, jewels, and goods of
especial value, not required by the guest for his daily use and convenience, and
to place them in such safe depository within the inn, as he may provide.-Per
WOODRUFF, J.

4. And notice of such requirement being actually given to the guest, orally er by a
printed notice furnished to and read by him, it is his duty to conform thereto,
and if he do not, and a loss is suffered in consequence, without the actual fault of
the landlord or his agents, the landlord is not liable for the loss.-Per WOODRUFF, J.

5. A summons issued from the Marine Court, containing only the given name of the
plaintiff, may be amended by the clerk of that court, in the presence and under
the authority thereof, by inserting the surname, where the defendant is not prejudiced thereby.
6. A claim against an innkeeper for money stolen at the inn, from the trunk of a
guest, is assignable.
From the fourth volume of the Reports of Cases determined in the New York
Common Pleas. By E. Delafield Smith.
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This action was brought by the assignee of a claim against
innkeepers to recover money lost under the following circumstances:
One Hugh Rose, of Charleston, South Carolina, became a guest
at the Metropolitan hotel, in the city of New York, of which the
defendants were the proprietors. On reaching the hotel, he made
the usual entry of his name in a book at the office, and a room was
assigned to him, of which he received the key.
At the head of each page, in the book above mentioned, were
plainly printed these words: "Money, jewels, and other valuable
packages, must be placed in the safe in the office, otherwise the proprietors will not be responsible for any loss." A similar notice was
embodied in a list of regulations posted upon the door of the room,
where there was, also, a conspicuous card, printed in crimson letters, as follows : 1" Notice. Money and valuables must be deposited
in the office for safe keeping. If the above request should not be
complied with, the proprietors will not be responsible. Simeon
Leland & Co." Mr. Rose was examined as a witness for the plaintiff, and admitted, in his testimony, that he observed the notices in
the room, but was not certain that the words in the book attracted
his attention. He made no deposit of money or valuables at the
office, and gave no notice that there was money in his room.
On the sixth of July, two days after his arrival at the hotel, he
packed and locked his baggage, consisting of a portmanteau, valise,
two trunks, and other articles, and also locked his room, and delivered
the key of the latter to a clerk at the office, who hung it up. It
was then about two o'clock, P. M. He asked for his bill, stated
that his baggage was ready for removal, and that he intended to
start for Saratoga by the next conveyance. Dinner having been
served, Mr. Rose inquired of the clerk whether his baggage had
been brought down, to which the clerk replied in the negative, and
stated that the cars for Saratoga would not leave until half after
five.
At about four o'clock, a porter of the house apprised him that his
room had been broken into. He proceeded up stairs; found the
door open and his portmanteau rifled of a purse containing $150 in
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American coin, and a number of foreign gold and silver pieces, of
the value of about $45. The lock of the portmanteau had been
broken off, and a chisel ]ay near. The money and coins were not
recovered, nor the thief apprehended.
The guest remained until the following day, and afterwards
executed and delivered to the plaintiff an assignment of his claim
against the proprietors of the hotel, receiving the plaintiff's note
for $25, as the consideration.
A summons was issued in the Marine Court, in the name of
Corydon, the given name of the plaintiff, his surname being omitted.
On the return of the process, all the parties appeared by attorney ;
and, on the motion of the plaintiff's attorney, the clerk amended
the summons by inserting the surname, in pursuance of the direction of the presiding justice.
The trial resulted in an award, by the court below, of judgment
in the plaintiff's favor, from which the defendants appealed to
this court.
J. Warren Lawton and Win. G. Larned, for the defendants.
lllason S. Brewster, for the plaintiff.
First J.-1. The amendment of the summons was
within the power of the court, was ordered by the court, did no
harm to the defendants, and is to be regarded by the appellate court
as a technical objection, not to be the ground of reversal.
2. The claim for property, whether arising ex contractu or ex
delicto, is assignable. We have lately held, a claim against a common carrier was assignable, and the same rule applies to innkeepers.
This point is well settled in all the courts.
3. The defendants claim to be exempt from liability for money
lost by robbery in the hotel, and on two grounds; first, because of
the notice given to the guests that they will not be liable for valuables and money, unless deposited in the safe; secondly, because,
without such notice, an innkeeper is not liable for money stolen out
of a trunk, or for any thing beyond necessary articles for a person
who is traveling.
INGRAIIA-.,
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That the carrier or innkeeper cannot limit his liability by a
general notice, has been repeatedly adjudged. I need 'only refer
to the cases of Jiollistervs. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234, and of Cole
vs. Goodwin &' tStory, 19 Wend. 251, as containing much law on
the point, and citing at least sufficient authorities to sustain the
decision of the court, that notice, although brought home to the
owner, did not relieve the carrier or innkeeper from liability for
the safety of their goods; and to Gould and others vs. Hill,
2 Hill's Rep. 623, that a special acceptance of the goods will not
discharge from such liability. Whether he may not, by a special
agreement entered into by both parties, restrict such liability, it is
not necessary now to inquire.
In some cases of common carriers, the liability has been, both in
the English and American courts, so far limited by a notice as to
require from the owner a disclosure of the contents of the packages,
and in cases of fraud or concealment, with a view to defraud the
carrier of his hire, to relieve him from liability to the extent of the
intended fraud. But these cases are based upon the supposed
right of the carrier to a reward proportionate to the risk. Thus,
when the owner informed the carrier that the package contained
X200, when, in fact it contained £450, the carrier was only held
responsible, in case of loss, to £200, as his reward was only for that
sum. See several cases cited in the opinion of Cole vs. Goodwin
et al., supra.
Upon the same principle, the case of the Orange County Bank
vs. Brown, 9 Wend. 85, was decided, holding, that a large sum of
money, placed in a traveler's trunk, was not within the protection
which the law gives to the traveler's baggage.
The notices in this case were, that the defendants would not be
liable for any thing of value, unless placed in the safe ; and even
admitting that they might, by such notice, require the traveler,
while he was staying at the hotel, to keep his money in the safe
of the establishment, which I do not mean to be understood as
adopting as law, yet it could not be that the traveler, while preparing to start on his journey, should be required still to leave
money in the safe until he actually leaves the hotel. It was not
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until he was packing his trunks for his journey, that he placed the
money in them, and as soon as it was done, the key of the room
was given to the proprietor, with the information that the baggage
was ready. I think nothing contained in the notices would answer
to limit the innkeeper's liability after he received the key, under
such circumstances.
It is contended that the innkeeper is not liable for money contained in the baggage, and so brought into the hotel without notice
of the same being given by the owner. In the case of innkeepers,
the liability in this respect is more extended than that of common
carriers. They cannot refuse to receive, with the guest, any kind
of goods he may bring, but they are bound to receive both, and
they are equally liable for the goods while the guest remains. The
innkeeper's compensation is his charge to the guest for his board
and lodging, and he receives no additional compensation, whether
the goods of the guest are of greater or less value. The ground,
therefore, upon which a common carrier is not responsible for concealment of money, &c., in baggage, viz., that he is defrauded of
his reward for the carriage, is not to be found in examining the
liability of the innkeeper.
Kent says, the responsibility of the innkeeper extends to all the
goods, chattels and moneys of his guest which are placed within the
inn. Again : "It is not necessary that the goods should have been
in the special keeping of the innkeeper; if they be in the inn, that
is sufficient to charge him." 2 Kent's Com. 593. In Qu.inton vs.
Courtney, 1 Haywood N. C. R. 40, the innkeeper was held liable
for money stolen out of the saddlebags of the guest, who had not
given notice of the contents of such bags to the innkeeper. (See,
also, 5 Term Rep. 275; 21 Wend. 282 ; 14 J. R. 175.) It can
hardly be necessary to cite authorities to show that the innkeeper
is liable for money stolen from the guest, when we look at the
necessity of the traveler having money with him in traveling, and
the like necessity of taking it with him to the inn when he enters
it. He is to be protected as to his property while he remains a
guest; and as no extra charge can be made, because he carries
money, so no exemption from liability can be claimed, if the fact of
having money is not disclosed to the innkeeper.
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The innkeeper is, I think, liable, whether the guest has the money
in his baggage or in the safe of the innkeeper; and where the guest
is required to deposit valuables in a safe, during his stay ai the inn,
even admitting that the innkeeper might, by a notice, so limit his
liability, still, where the baggage is prepared for traveling, and has
been placed under the care of the innkeeper's servants for that purpose, he is liable, notwithstanding such notice. The liability in
such case is the same as it would be on arrival, before the guest's
baggage had gone to his room. If stolen then, the innkeeper would
be responsible. So after it is prepared for leaving the hotel, the
same liability exists, however much in the intermediate time such
liability may have been limited by notice.
The judgment should be affirmed.
DALY, J., concurred in affirming the judgment, but filed no
opinion.
WOODRUFF, J.-I
concur in the result to which the first judge
has arrived in this case. After the guest had packed his trunks
and portmanteau preparatory to leaving the inn, and had notified
the proprietors thereof, and placed the same under their control, by
giving up the key to his room, their responsibility for the safekeeping and due delivery of the trunks, &c., with their contents,
became full and unqualified; and I know of no rule which, in the
absence of any fraud, deception or imposition, exempts the innkeeper in general from responsibility for all the goods and property
which the traveler brings with him to the inn.
But the duty of the innkeeper to keep and protect such property,
carries with it the right to provide such reasonable places of deposit
-within the inn as he may deem most secure; and if the guest will
not give up the manual possession of the goods to the innkeeper, to
be preserved by him during his stay, in my judgment the traveler
takes the risk of loss from any cause happening without the actual
fault or negligence of the landlord, or his servants or agents.
And when it appears that the landlord had provided such place
of deposit, and the guest had actual notice thereof, and notice that
the landlord required valuables to be delivered into his actual cus-
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tody to be deposited in such place, the guest was bound to conform
to this reasonable requirement. He upon whom the absolute duty
to preserve and keep rested, had a right to direct that he be suffered to take the actual custody of the goods for the purpose of
preservation.
And I think it would be an error to say that this is, in the proper
sense of the words, a limitation of the innkeeper's responsibility. It
is only a reasonable regulation, recognizing and based upon his full
responsibility, as an insurer; and, in my judgment, the right to
make the regulation and insist on its observance necessarily result
from that responsibility. The protection of the innkeeper by reasonable rules respecting the custody of the goods of the guest while
he remains at the inn, is not disfavored in the law, and it is eminently just that he upon whom the responsibility for the safety of
the goods doth rest, shall have power to use such guards for that
safe keeping as are consistent with the due comfort and convenience
of the guest. The clothing of the guest, and articles necessary for
his daily use and comfort while remaining, could not, of course,
under this view of the subject, be removed from him, so as to interfere with or interrupt that use and convenience. But goods, merchandise and money, in trunks or packages, are, in my opinion, subject to the landlord's reasonable requirement in this respect.
In the present case, the testimony of the guest himself brings
home the notice to him in a form equivalent to an actual oral
demand by the landlord; and as he saw and read the notices, he
was bound to conform to the requirement contained therein, and
deposit the package of money with the landlord.
Had the loss then happened from the neglect of that precaution
during his stay at the inn, and before he had given up his room
and surrendered the key, and partially placed his trunks, &c., in
the defendant's charge, I should have deemed the innkeeper free
from responsibility, if free from fault or negligence.
But for the reason first above suggested, I concur in affirming
the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.

CARGO OF THE GREAT REPUBLIC.

.ln the Superior Court of New York.
IN THE MATTER OF THE CARGO OF THE GREAT REPUBLIC.
1. The true rule with regard to the right to contribution in the maritime law is the
achievement of the object designed even for a short period of time by the sacrifice of the property; and this will be sufficient to give rise to and justify contribution, notwithstanding there may be a subsequent loss, provided the latter
results from a new peril.
2. In a case where the following facts appeared-that the original or primary cause
of the loss was an accident, not the subject of general average ; that the proximate
cause of the preservation of all that was saved was the scuttling of the ship ; that
the immediate cause of the scuttlingwas afire between the lower decks of the vessel;
that such fire was brought there by a burning spar which had been cut away by
the voluntary act of the crew; that such act instead of averting the peril it was
designed to prevent, was the real and efficient agent of the loss that followed :
H eld, first, that the direct damage to the cargo in the lower hold as well as that
to the ship's knees and timbers by the scuttling, is a proper subject for contribution: Second, No damage to the cargo between decks and on fire, arising frqm
the water thrown in is a proper subject for contribution.
3. Methods of computing and rules for contribution suggested.

The opinion of the court, in which the facts fully appear, was
delivered by
HoFFMAN, J.-The complaint presents the following case :-That
on the 6th of December, 1853, John B. Kitching shipped on board
of the vessel called the Great Republic, then lying in the port of
New York, six hundred tierces of mess beef, of the value of %15,900,
to be carried in and aboard of such ship from the port of New York
to Liverpool, there to be delivered.
That on the 26th of December, 1853, the ship took fire, 'and was
so badly damaged and burnt, that she was rendered incapable of
sailing, and the voyage was abandoned. That the beef was discharged from the ship, and delivered to the defendants, who, with
the assent of all parties, became receivers of the cargo and ship,
and of the proceeds of such parts as were pioper to be sold-to
pay over such proceeds to the parties who might be entitled.
That on the 1st of February, 1854, the defendants caused to be
sold at public auction, five hundred and ninety-five of such six hundred tierces of beef, and about the 13th of February, collected the
proceeds thereof, viz: the sum of $14,416 87; that they became
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liable to pay such amount, and were requested to do so, after deducting their reasonable commissions of $360 42; *hich they had
refused.
The answer of the defendants states:
That besides the beef of the plaintiffs shipped on board the
vessel, there was a large cargo belonging to other persons, to be
carried in like manner to Liverpool, according to the tenor of
sundry bills of lading, excepting only the danger of the seas and
fire. The breaking out of a fire in Front street, and its communication to the ship, is then stated, by which she and her cargo were
put in imminent peril of destruction ; and to preserve them, it
became necessary to cut away the masts, which was done, and in
doing which, other portions of the ship and the cargo, the said
tierces of beef and other portions of the cargo laden on board, were
saved and preserved; and hence that the plaintiffs became liable to
coiitribute to the amount of such losses, damages and expenses,
voluntarily incurred as aforesaid, in a general average. That the
plaintiffs had agrecd, that so much as they might be thus responsible for should be retained out of the proceeds of the sales of the
beef. Such sales had been made by the defendants, as general
agents of all parties by consent, and amounted to the sum of
$14,056 45, after deducting their commissions; and that the
amount for which the defendants were liable, upon such general
average, was the sum of $11,841 70, leaving a net balance due of
$2,214 75, which the defendants offered to pay.
The cause was tried before the Chief Justice and a jury, in
March, 1855. A verdict was taken, by consent, in favor of the
plaintiffs, for the sum of 814,056 45 damages, and $1,500 for
interest, subject to the opinion of the court, at general term, on
the questions of law arising upon the statement and adjustment of
general average; and subject also to adjustment of the amount of
the said verdict by the court, and with liberty to either party to
turn the case into a bill of exceptions."
1st. About midnight, of the 26th of December, 1853, the ship
was lying at the foot of Dover street, with nearly all her cargo on
board, and her sails bent below her royals. A fire broke out in
Front street, nearly in a line with the ship, as the wind was then
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blowing. The watchman awoke the second mate, with information
of the fire and that coals were falling about the ship. All hands
were called and stationed. Men were sent into the fore, main, and
mizzen-tops with buckets.
The foresail soon burst into a flame. Attempts to beat out the
fire in it failed, and the men stationed in the fore-top were driven
out of it. The mizzen-top-sail and the mizzen-top-gallant-sail had
then taken fire. The crew attempted to extinguish this, and to cut
the sails adrift from the yards. These efforts were in vain-the dry
cotton canvas soon being a sheet of flame. The firemen had, about
this time, arrived with their engines; but would not work on board,
or near the ship, for fear of the blocks and other articles, on fire
aloft, falling on them. It was then concluded, for the preservation
of the ship and cargo, to cut away the masts.
Here, we may notice, was the first determination to do an act of
destruction, to contribute to the general safety.
At that time, the sails, spars and rigging at, and the heads of
the lower masts were on fire. No material damage had been done
to the spars by fire.
In executing this determination, the forestay, and foretop-mast
stay were first cut away, and fell over the starboard rail into the
dock. The foretop-mast broke short off, and fell down endwise,
through three decks, being on fire at the time, and (as hereafter
particularly noticed) set the cargo and the lower part of the vessel
on fire. The mainmast was next cut away; and, in falling, crushed
the boats, rails, &c., on the starboard side, and the houses on deck,
broke the steam engine, and did other damage. The houses, &c.,
on the upper deck, were all more or less on fire at the time.
After the masts, spars, &c., were cut away, the firemen came on
board with their hose, and finally succeeded in putting out the fire
on the deck; and it was supposed that the ship and cargo were
saved. But all the houses, companionways on, and the upper
deck, rails, &c., abaft the mainmast, were destroyed, or very badly
burned. The cabin in the upper between-decks, with all its furniture, the stem of the ship, rudder heads, stores, spare sails, and a
quantity of bread in the upper between-decks, also perished.
18
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It is also found that the masts, spars, &c., cut away were nearly
destroyed by fire, after they fell on deck.
The fire on and about the upper deck being extinguished, several
streams (of the engines) were removed to another fire which bad
broken out in the city. After this it was discovered that the cargo
was on fire in the lower between-decks, caused by the foretop-mast
falling through the decks, being on fire at the time.
This unfortunate result brings us to the consideration of the
facts attending the second period of the accident; and it is necessary to understand these facts and circumstances, with regard to
two points of the case:
First.-Whether they displace the apparent right to a contribution for the masts, &c., cut away, assuming such a right to have
existed.
NA'ext (and of far more importance), Whether they give a foundation to the claim for contribution for nearly two-thirds of the
original value of the ship, and for about one-half of the cargo as
well as for the freight.
And this last question is to be examined also, in connection with
all the facts from the commencement to the end of the disaster.
It is found that after the fire on and about the upper deck had
been extinguished, and several streams had been removed to attend
another fire in the city, it was discovered, that the ship and her
cargo were on fire in the lower between-decks, caused by the topmast falling down through the decks, (it being on fire at the time,)
and thus setting the cargo and the ship in the lower between-decks
on fire. When discovered, it had such headway that all attempts
to extinguish it from above were soon found to be fruitless; and
the ship was, therefore, scuttled in three separate places, and soon
sunk down ten feet, when she struck the bottom. Every effort to
put out the fire was ineffectual, and the ship burned for two days,
when, being burned to the water's edge from aft to about the
foremast, it was extinguished. The cargo was burned badly in the
second and third between-decks; but that in the lower hold was
only damaged by water.
Up to the time of cutting the masts away, the cargo had sus-
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taned no damage by either fire or water; nor was it damaged by
the water thrown in or on the ship to extinguish the flames on the
upper and in the upper between-decks ; and not until the fire was
discovered below, caused by the falling of the foretop-mast through
the decks, did it sustain any damage, by either fire or water.
The grain in the lower hold had swelled so as to break the knees
and beams of the lower deck, and otherwise badly strain and injure
the ship.
The vessel was afterwards floated, the cargo taken out, and the
ship condemned and sold.
I. The first question is as to the effect of these events upon
the right to contribution for the masts, &c. cut away, supposing it
to have been otherwise due.
I consider the true rule to be, that the achievement of the object
designed, even for a very short period of time, will be sufficient to
justify contribution, notwithstanding a subsequent loss, provided the
ultimate loss results from a new peril.
II. I come next to the consideration of that important part of
the cause which relates to the almost total destruction of the vessel,
and of about half the cargo, for which contribution is sought.
The general features of this interesting part of the case are these:
That the original or primary cause of the loss was an accident, not
the subject of general average; that a proximate cause of the preservation of the hull and cargo was the scuttling of the ship; that
the immediate cause of the scuttling was a fire in the hold and between the lower decks of the vessel; that such fire was brought
there by a voluntary act of destruction; and that such voluntary
act, instead of averting the peril it was intended to prevent, was an
actual and efficient agent of the loss that ensued. The primary and
accidental cause of the disaster was transferred from one part of
the ship to the other. It became a continuation of that original
cause; a transmission of it, in its full and unremitted character, to
the vessel and cargo.
Had no measures been taken to arrest the flames, the vessel and
cargo would have been destroyed. Had the scuttling not taken
place, the same identical results would have ensued; and ensued,
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not merely in spite of the voluntary act, but as its direct and immediate consequence. Had the vessel been left unscuttled, a heavy
gale of wind, and dash of the waves might have preserved some
portions of her hull and of the cargo. Would it have been possible
to sustain a claim for contribution under such circumstances ?
There are cases where contribution has been compelled for services honestly made, although a severe injury might have left it
questionable whether they were essential to the preservation which
ensued. But to award contribution for a voluntary act which
directly led to the destruction, or which, at least, did not for a moment interrupt the progress of the original cause of the disaster-and
when that cause was fortuitous-seems unsanctioned by principle or
authority.
With such exceptions, I apprehend the pervading principle of
contribution is such as I have stated. There must be the intent to
sacrifice the thing designated. The sacrifice must be accomplished.
Some definite advantage must have sprung from it. A final preservation must ensue, not indeed by a logical necessity, directly and
solely from the sacrifice, but as reasonably contributed to by it, or
as consistent with it, as with any hypothesis the circumstances will
allow.
If such is the ruling principle to be found in the law upon this
subject, the present case, in the view now considered, cannot admit
of doubt. The destruction contemplated was of the masts and
spars, and the ordinary consequential damage. The vessel and
each part of the cargo was meant to be saved, not sacrificed.
What was designedly given up was uselessly destroyed or surrendered, and what it was meant to preserve was destroyed by the very
act of sacrifice.
We are brought, then, to the consideration of the next material
act of the agency of man in this catastrophe, viz., the effect of the
scuttling. It will be remembered that the ship, when scuttled, sank
down ten feet, when she struck the bottom.
What, then, was the effect of the scuttling ? Let it be conceded
that all that was preserved of cargo or vessel, was saved by this act.
Let the utmost force be yielded to the argument of counsel, that, as
the vessel was lightened by the progress of the fire, she would have
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gradually risen to meet, as it were, the fatal embrace of the flames.
She would then have burnt lower, and for a considerable part of the
ten feet, which by the scuttling was submerged. And thus, the ten
feet of frame, and the principal portion of the cargo rescued, owed
their safety to this deed.
Still the important and decisive question remains: What part of
the ship was destroyed by the scuttling ? It is indispensable, in
conformity with the principles before stated, that such destruction
should be directly traced to the scuttling, and an appreciation of it
be possible.
The flames continued for two days, and burnt the vessel to the
water's edge, from aft to near the foremast; and no part of the
damage can, upon the finding, be attributed to the scuttling, except
the breaking of the knees and beams of the lower deck, and the
strain and injury arising from the swelling of the grain in the
lower hold.
And as to the cargo, that in the lower hold was only damaged
by the water. All the rest was chiefly, if not solely, injured by
the fire.
The question appears to be reduced to this :-Shall the amount
of injury to the ship, and damage to the cargo, which can be definitely traced to the scuttling, be brought into the general average?
We apprehend that this decision may best be placed upon a settled rule of law, that no contribution can be claimed for a loss of
cargo which is damaged by its own proper vice.
Mr. Benecke (Benecke on Average, p. 132, Boston edition, 1853)
says-an injury ascribable to the quality of the goods ought never
to prejudice the rest of the shippers, or the ship-owners.
In the Dictionaire de Droit Commercial of Grousset & Meiger,
(Paris, 1852, vol. 1, p. 532, Astor Library,) it is stated, that if the
loss results from the proper vice of the article, the owner must bear
the consequences. Delaborde, p. 40, is cited for the proposition.
Roccus states the same rule. (Ingersoll's Translation, 83.) And
Boulay Paty, in his edition of Emerigon, (Paris, 1827, Astor
Library,) declares also, that a loss arising from the proper vice of
the cargo, is matter of simple average, (§ 433.)
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The two articles of the Code of Commerce seem explicit to this
point. The like rule was applied in the case of Bond vs. The
Superb, Wallace, Jr., Rep. 855.
But the present case is different. The fire was fortuitous. We
may treat it precisely as if it had originated by accident in the
between-decks. The scuttling necessarily brought a direct and
immediate damage to the cargo in the lower hold-the grain, it is
presumed. It brought it intentionally. It was certainly to be
anticipated that a damage to that article of the cargo would result.
It preserved, in a damaged state, a part of that article, and it preserved whatever of the residue of the cargo was saved, and that relic
of the vessel which was raised.
Mr. Benecke (page 165) says :--"If sacrifices be made in order
to extinguish the fire, (occasioned by lightning, intrinsic quality, or
other accidental causes,) if masts or cables, for example, be cut
away, or the vessel be run ashore, I am of opinion that the damage
ought to be general average, although an instance of a decision to
the contrary is quoted by Emerigon."
lie proceeds :-" If water be thrown down the hatches to stop
the progress of an accidental fire in the hold, or between-decks,
saving the articles which had already cuught fire from utter destruction, and of extricating the vessel and rest of the cargo from an
imminent danger, the effect of the water upon the former goods
is, therefore, particular average. It is not an injury, but a real
advantage to them. But the damage done by the water is, I conceive, of the nature of a general average."
It appears to us that the direct damage done to the cargo in the
lower hold, by the scuttling, is a proper subject for contribution.
We presume it can be arrived at by a comparison of the invoices of
the grain there stowed, and the proceeds of the sales of such grain.
No damage to the articles of the cargo which were between decks,
and on fire, arising from the water thrown in, is to be contributed
for. The fire is to be still considered as an accidental fire. And
we think that the damage to the knees and timbers, resulting
ing from the swelling of the grain in the lower hold, which directly
sprung from the scuttling, is to be allowed. What would it have
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cost to repair that specific injury ? This we suppose the adjusters
can without difficulty ascertain, and with reasonable precision.
III. It is next necessary to state what rules of valuation are
applicable to the subjects which are to be allowed for, and those
which are to contribute.
1st. The amount to be allowed for the ship is that sum which the
adjusters shall be able to say arose definitely from the injury to the
knees and beams of the lower deck, and the strain to the ship produced by the swelling of the grain in the lower hold.
The ship is to contribute upon the proceeds of the sales of her
hull and materials, to which is to be added that amount which the
adjusters shall ascertain ought to be allowed for injury to the knees,
Dodge vs. The United Insurance Co.
&c., as above stated.
17 Mass. 475; 2 Phillips on Ins. 137, 4th edition, Pardessus,
art. 748.
2. The damage to the cargo to be allowed for, is to be ascertained by a comparison of the proceeds of the sales with the invoice
costs.
The ordinary rule in a case of jettison is to take the value at the
port of destination, and to allow that value, as well as to fix the
amount of contribution upon the same basis for what is saved.
2 Phillips, 4th ed., p. 132. Where sales of damaged goods have
been made, the difference between the sales and the valuation,
if sound, is the amount to be allowed. If goods are sold at
the place to which the apportionment relates, the amount of
the proceeds is the basis on which their contributory value is
fixed (2 Phillips, 151, ed. 1854); and goods are contributed for
at the same rate and on the same basis as goods contribute. Ibid,
p. 132.
In a case like the present, where the voyage has not commenced,
and the goods were recently shipped, their value may properly be
tested by the invoices; and the sales of the goods at the same port
of shipment may be taken as evidence of their value after the disaster. The difference is the damage to be allowed.
8. The next question is, on what basis is the residue of the cargo
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to contribute ? The ordinary rule is, that in cases of jettison, the
cargo is to contribute upon the value of the goods estimated at their
prime cost, or original value; or if the vessel has arrived at her
port of destination, at their value at such port. Rogers vs. The
Mechanics' Insurance Co., 2 Story's Rep. 173.
Mr. Abbott states, (347,) that if the ship, in consequence of any
misfortune to be sustained by general average, be compelled to
return to its loading port, and the average be immediately adjusted,
in that case the goods only contribute according to the invoice
prices, for the price of the sale is unknown.
In The Mutual Insurance Company vs. The Cargo of the George,
8 Law Rep. 361, the ship was stranded, and unable to return to the
port of departure, or to adopt an intermediate port. The vessel
was lost, and a greater part of the cargo saved.
The cargo was adjudged to contribute at the prices stated in the
invoices and bills of lading, deducting therefrom salvage and other
necessary expenses incurred in consequence of the wreck.
But in these instances the value of the cargo, as preserved, was
to be arrived at-it being a fixed rule, that a subject is to pay
according to its value as it exists when called on to contribute.
But in the present case, all the cargo was, to some extent, injured.
All that was preserved was sold. The prices may be taken as a fair
test of the value of what was saved.
We may add that, in the present case, the consent of all the parties interested to a sale of all the cargo, renders this mode of adjusting the basis of contribution proper, even if another would, in
ordinary cases, be more regular.
IV. In this connection another question arises. It is a general
rule, that the goods or articles sacrificed and allowed for, are made
to contribute in common with those saved.
If merchandise is thrown overboard worth $1,000, and the residue
of the cargo, and the vessel, valued at $10,000, it is plain that if
the owners of the latter pay the whole $1,000, the owner of the
goods jettisoned loses nothing. It is, however, a fundamental principle that he is to be dealt with precisely as if the goods of another
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had been sacrificed. Hence, he pays with the others; and the contributory interests in the case stated are $11,000, instead of
$10,000, or 9.09 per cent., instead of 10 per cent.
In the present instance, on the assumption that only the grain in
the lower hold was damaged by the scuttling, and therefore the
subject of a general average, the loss was $45,409 38.
The owners of this grain pay, of course, their proportionate
amount of the proceeds of the sales of what was saved. But if they
pay nothing upon the amount contributed to them, they would receive from others the whole $45,409 88, and get, in other words, the
whole value of the goods thus lost to them. They should pay the
same percentage on what they get as the owners of the other portions of the cargo pay upon what they receive.
We therefore add to the value of the cargo which is to contribute,
the amount of the loss which is to be paid to the owners of that part
of the cargo allowed for.
V. The next question is, whether the freight should be contributed for. The voyage was broken up. The voyage cannot be
said, indeed, to have commenced. The contracts of affreightment
were at an end. Not a dollar of freight had been earned. How
can it be treated as sacrificed ? The ship is not allowed for. Its
accessory, the freight, cannot be.
When freight was allowed in The Columbian Insuravee Co. vs.
Ashley, 13 Peters, 864, it was because the ship was allowed for.
It was lost, as well as the ship, by the sacrifice for the common
good. And when freight pro rata itneris (that is, the freight
which had been earned at the time of the disaster) was allowed in
Gray vs. Walker, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 229, the ship was also a subject of general average.
To allow freight in this case would be, in effect, to make contributors in general average insurers of the freight.
It follows, in this case, that if freight is not to be allowed for, it
is not to contribute.
The result is, that the adjustment must be revised upon the principles stated.

GREENWALD vs. INSURANCE COMPANY.

District Court of Philadelphia.
GREENWALD vs. THE INSURANCE COMPANY.
1. A clause in a policy of fire insurance, that the insurers should not be liable for
a loss from an explosion o gunpowder, applies to the case of a fire originating
from the explosion of gunpowder on the premises.
2. Where, to stay the spread of flames, a house already on fire is blown up with gunpowder, there being no means of extinguishing fire by water in the town, the
insurers are liable.

The case came came up on a rule for new trial, on points reserved.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, P. J.-The question as to whether the alleged defects
in the preliminary proofs had been waived, was left to the jury,
and their verdict, unless there was absolutely no evidence, a court
ought not to interfere with on such question. Here the only
evidence was, that when the first papers were presented certain
objections were made, another was prepared, which in the opinion
of the only witness examined, obviated those objections. That last
paper was received by the officer of the company, with the remark
that he would look over the papers, and if satisfactory, all would be
right. The case of Bumstead vs. Dividend Mutual Insurance
Company, 2 Kernan, 81, holds that the reception of such papers,
without objection to their form, is evidence of a waiver of any merely
technical defects in this respect.
As to the main point reserved, it appeared that the property
insured, a stock of merchandise in a frame store building, was
situated in the town of Americus, Georgia, in which there are no
means of extinguishing a fire by the use of water. It appears that
the fire in question did not originate on the premises insured, but it
had reached them and they were burning when the citizens assembled,
with the view to extinguish the fire and prevent Its spreading further,
applied gunpowder to them and blew them up. Had this measure
been resorted to before the fire had actually begun its work of
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destruction on the property insured, it might be a question whether
the underwriters would be liable. iHilliers vs. Allegheny Mlutual
.Tnsurance Company, 8 Barr, 470, might be an authority in this case.
But here altogether apart from the fire caused by the explosion the
proximate loss was a fire not caused by an explosion. The case is
like the destruction of goods by water applied to extinguish the flames
which had caught them or the building in which they are stored.
If left to themselves they would have been inevitably destroyed by
the fire; it would last as long as it had fuel to feed on. It is certainly very much against the true interests of insurers to raise
objections founded on the honest efforts of the insured or others, to
prevent the spread of fires, much more to frame clauses meant to
make the right of recovery depend upon what is or is not done by
strangers or others present at the fire. Life indeed as well as property is often in peril, but where it is not, men might be disposed
under such circumstances, out of regard to the insured, to stand still
and let property perish, rather than imperil by interfering with his
claim for indemnity against the insurers. It would be a novel clause
to introduce into a policy that in case of fire, the insurance should be
void, if any water were applied to extinguish it. Quite as novel
would it be were it provided that if there were no water nothing else
should be done. Yet the defendants in this case have told us, that
the clause, that the insurers should not be liable for an explosion by
gunpowder, was meant to guard against the very thing which had
been done. Had the citizens of Americus, instead of resorting to
gunpowder, have succeeded in any other way in separating the building in question from those contiguous to it, we would probably have
been told that it was destruction by a mob, against which there is a
provision in most policies, if not in this. We construe this clause
differently, and more for the interests of the underwriters when we
say, that fire originatingfrom an explosion of gunpowder was what
was meant to be guarded against, and not an honest effort, even if
it was injudicious, on the part of those present to stop the flames.
Rule discharged and-judgment for plaintiff.

MUSSER ET AL. vs. RAILWAY COMPANY.

in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania-In -Equity.
MUSSER ET AL. VS. THE FAIRMOUNT AND ARCH STREET RAILWAY COMPANY.
Where, in an act of the legislature incorporating a City Passenger Railway, it was
provided that the consent of the City Councils, to use or occupy the streets should
be first obtained before the said company should construct their track, and the
City Councils by ordinance declared their disapproval of the said act and declined
to allow the streets to be so used, it was held that the power designated by the
legislature was exhausted and that no subsequent ordinance of the City Councils
consenting to the use of the streets upon certain conditions could revive the priviledge nullified by the ordinance of disapproval.

This was an application for an injunction to restrain the defendants from constructing a passenger railway in the city of Philadelphia, commencing at Tenth and Arch streets and continuing westward to Twenty-first street, and thence to Fairmount.
The defendants' charter, approved April 16, 1858, provided that
the consent of the City Councils to use the streets should first be
obtained. On the 5th May, Councils by ordinance declared their
disapproval. But on the 16th December, they passed another ordinance, consenting conditionally to the defendants' use of the said
streets. And the question was, whether the first ordinance exhausted the power delegated by the legislative act.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
THOMPSoN, J.-The public have a right to the maintenance of
streets and roads as common highways, subject to restriction by the
legislative power of the Commonwealth. There is no longer any
reason for controversy as to the right of the legislature to grant the
use of them to companies proposing to facilitate the transit of the
public along them. This is settled definitely in the cases of the
Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Company, 5 Wharton, 25, and
the Commonwealth vs. The Erie and Northeast Railroad Company,
3 Casey, 339. An unauthorized occupancy of a street by railroad
tracks upon it, is a nuisance per se, &c., and its use as well as their
removal may be controlled by the injunction at the suit of any
member of the public; 3 Casey, ib. The question now before us
turns solely upon the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the occupancy
of Arch street by the Fairmount and Arch street Passenger Rail-

MUSSER ET AL. vs. RAILWAY COMIPANY.

way Company. If they have a valid charter, all questions of inconvenience to the immediate residents along the street are outside of
the case. If they have not, considerations of convenience to the
public generally, from passenger railways, are equally unimportant
here.
On the 16th day of April, 1858, the respondents were incorporated, with power to "lay out and construct a railway, commencing
at Tenth and Arch streets, and continuing westward along the same
with a double track, to Twentieth and Twenty-first streets respectively, with a single track to Callowhill street, and thence westwardly with a double track to the Wire Bridge at Fairmount."
This absolute grant in the first section, however, was to be dependent for vitality on the action, or silence of the City Councils.
The provisions on the subject is in these words: "And provided
further, that before the said company shall use or occupy the said
streets, the consent of the Councils of the city of Philadelphia shall
be first obtained, and the consent shall be taken and deemed to have
been given if said Councils shall not, within thirty days after the
passage of this act, by ordinance duly passed, signify their disapproval thereof."
It was to be, as is apparent from this provision, equally effective
in giving vitality to the company, whether consent was affirmatively
given within thirty days, or entire silence was observed by the
Council. In either case the company were authorized to "use and
occupy the streets." But if, within the time limited, the Councils
disapproved the act of Assembly in the mode prescribed there, the
privileges granted to the company were to be at an end. in common parlance, the Councils were invested with the power to veto the
proposed road. If they exercised the power, and did nothing more
it could not be doubted, I think, but that the privilege granted to
occupy the streets would thereafter become funetus.
On the 5th of May, 1858, and within the prescribed period, the
Councils did in due form "ordain, that in pursuance of the power
and authority in them vested by the said act of Assembly, Councils
do hereby declare their disapproval of the said act of Assembly, in
the above preamble mentioned, and of the rights therein respectively
granted to ' the Fairmount and Arch street City Passenger Rail-
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way Company,' to occupy the streets and highways of the city of
Philadelphia."
This ordinance, authorized by the legislature, and passed in pursuance of the act, if there be nothing following it sufficiently efficacious to control its effect, certainly terminated the rights of the
company to use and occupy the streets mentioned in the act from
and after its passage.
On the 16th of December, 1858, more than six months after the
passage of the foregoing ordinance, the Councils passed another, by
which they gave consent to use the streets, on condition that the
company would surrender certain privileges, granted in the act of
incorporation, and give security to be obedient to existing and future
ordinances of the city.
The complainants contend that the legislature conferred upon the
Councils the right of election, whether the company should or should
not have the privileges granted to use the streets, and limited the
time to thirty days, within which it should be exercised, and that
they did elect within the period prescribed, that they should not be
so used.
In statutes, as in contracts, the rights of election, where exercised,
like the execution of a power, satisfies the right. If this were not
so, there would be no such thing as election ; for otherwise it would
be dependent on the varying and changing opinions and minds of
those exercising it. This would not be an election. The Councils
in this instance were the constituted agents to give vitality to the
legislative enactment, and the mode and manner of doing it, and
the time within which it was to be done, were all prescribed. Their
consent was to give vitality, their disapproval to nullify. Within
thirty days they had power to elect to do either. After that there
was no authority to choose. A power granted must be executed
according to the terms prescribed, and within the time limited, otherwise it will be void. 10 Watts, 278. If executed within these terms
the power is exhausted; and it lies with the grantor of the power to
renew it, the agent cannot re-invest himself with it ; if he could,
the power would exist independently of its conditions and limitations,
and in disregard of the expressed will of the grantor. The right of
election exists upon the same principles. We cannot view the case
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before us as distinguishable from, or an exception to these general
principles. When the legislature, out of regard to the local interests to be effected by the grant to this company, conferred upon the
Councils the power of disapproval of the act of incorporation, they
undoubtedly meant that if disapproved within the time limited, it
should be inoperative as to the privileges granted, or why confer it?
It must also be conclusively presumed that the effect of disapproval
was contemplated, and that the effect was the nullification of the act.
When the act of election to disapprove took place, the grant of the
privileges fell, and thus the matter remained until after the prescribed period of action passed by. After this, to whom did the
power of resuscitation belong ? To the Legislature or the Councils ?
The latter could only act on the authority given by the former.
They have no inherent power over the matter, and we look in vain
for any express power to elect a second time, and thus vitalize what
they had destroyed. Like the company, the municipal corporation
can only exercise such functions as are given to it, and when the
mode and manner is prescribed, they must be followed. They cannot exist as doubtful powers, for the principle is applicable to them,
as to other corporations, that whatever is not clearly granted is
withheld. Possessing the delegated power to nullify an act of legislature, without a similar delegation of power, they could not revive
a defunct act or privilege. There is no such delegation in this case
and I think the conclusion cannot be resisted that the Councils could
not revive privileges totally nullified by the ordinance of disapproval,
and that the act of 16th December conferred no rights upon the
company.
I do not subscribe to the theory that the only object of disapproval
was to prevent the presumption of assent. This was not what the
legislature meant or said, and what the Councils intended is another
thing. We look to the former, and are obliged to disregard the
latter, unless it is in accordance with the legislative will. The
Councils did the act they were authorized to do. They did it in
the manner prescribed and within the time; after that they were
powerless, and the law gives effect to the act and withholds the
privileges denied to the company by them. The only power that
can revive those privileges is the legislature, and to that the con-
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pany must appeal. If the Councils could disapprove, and afterwards, without regard to time, approve, where would be the end and
limit to their right of choice or election ? The rights and privileges
of the company, under such circumstances, might with truth be said
to be vagrant, indeed sometimes in abeyance, sometimes active, and
again in abeyance, as the changes in opinions of a changing majority
might happen to be.
It is unnecessary, under this view of the case, to discuss fully the
ordinance of 16th December, 1858. To my mind, it is obnoxious to the most grave objections as an exercise of the right of election, on the execution of a power. It is conditional, dependent on
the act of the company in surrendering certain privileges. The
legislature undoubtedly only conferred the right of election upon
Councils, under the law as passed. There is no room, I think, for
an argument, that they might change the form of enactment to suit
their views, and then approve. This would be to assent to, and
bring into active operation, what the legislature did not assent to
and enact, and would be legislation in its fullest sense. It will not
answer the objection in my mind, to point to the immateriality of
the change-the legislative will is unalterable, excepting by its own
authority. If Councils, under the authority given, should in any
particular, stipulate for a distinct change of the enactment as a condition for their assent, they might do the same thing in several or
many particulars, and thus change the whole character of the
organic law of the company. This would be legislation beyond their
chartered limits, and could not be sustained for a moment, there
being no authority to sanction it. But the very act of approval in
this instance was conditional, and contingent upon the surrender of
certain privileges, to be evidenced by prescribed acts of the company.
Standing alone, the ordinance was virtually a disapproval, for it
was conditional, and not to be an act of assent until the law was
modified by a withdrawal of the privileges mentioned. It was to
become an assent under the law, not by the act of Councils alone,
as the statute required, but on the performanca of an act by the
company. This, I think, was a defective and inoperative exercise
of the power of election conferred, even if it had been within their
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power to act, which I deny, after the passage of the ordinance of
the 6th of May, 1858, and without regard to the time fixed for
action. The Railway Company does not possess the power to
occupy and use the streets in the complainant's bill mentioned, and
it is my duty to grant the preliminary injunction as prayed for, to
restrain them from so doing. The majority of the judges who
sat in the hearing of this case, concur in opinion that the injunction
should issue. The reasons given are my own. Decree accordingly.

In the Quarter Sessions of Allegheny County, December, 1858.
COMMONWEALTH vs. GEORGR SHAW.
1. When a juror is withdrawn from the panel at a criminal trial, even by consent,

the fact must be noted of record.
2. The record must show that twelve jurors were sworn, and if it appear that less
or more than twelve delivered the verdict, it is error.
3. Waiver by consent of a prisoner in a criminal case, is a nullity.

In the month of October, 1858, George Shaw was indicted, tried
and convicted, in the Quarter Sessions, of an attempt to abduct or
kidnap Geo. W. Ferris, an alleged negro, out of the State, for the
purpose of selling him into slavery. On the second day of the
trial one of the jurors was taken sick, as was alleged. By consent
of counsel the court allowed the trial to proceed with eleven jurors.
A full report of the trial will be found in the Pittsburg Legal Journal
of Oct. 23, 1858, (No. 15, vol. 6.)
A motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial was made by
prisoner's counsel, who assigned numerous reasons therefor, of which
the following was most relied on.
That the verdict rendered was not the verdict of a jury under
the constitution and laws, inasmuch as it was the verdict of eleven
jurors-the twelfth, after being duly sworn, and hearing part of the
evidence, being absent and not joining in the verdict.
Authorities.-Const. sect. 6, art. IX; 4 Binn. 424.; 5 Barr, 208;
19
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1 Chitty Cr. L. 585; 8 S. & R. 237; 1 Harr. 200; 1 Chitty Cr.
L. 629-0; 2 Hale, 296, (note 2.)
The motion was argued on the 80th of October, by lfarshall
Swartzwelder for the prisoner, and by John X. Kirkpatrick for
the Commonwealth. A complete report of the argument and authorities cited is given in the Pittsburg Legal Journal of Nov. 6,
1858, (No. 17, vol. 6.)
The following opinion of the court, granting the motion, was delivered December 18, 1858, by
MCCLURE, P. J.-The verdict in this case was the verdict of
eleven jurors.
During the progress of the trial, when the names of the jurors
were called in the morning, one was absent. It appeared he was
seized with a sudden and violent illness during the night, and it was
manifest and conceded that his further attendance during the trial
was out of the question. The prisoner's counsel at once said he
was willing to go on with eleven jurors. The District Attorney
instantly replied that the Commonwealth had no objections. The
case went on; the prisoner was convicted.
The momentous question arises in this case, whether judgment
can be pronounced on a verdict rendered by eleven jurors. This
question is of paramount importance, and no other reasons will be
noticed which may have been filed in arrest of judgment or for a
new trial.
To say that the record shows that twelve jurors were sworn, and
that the record imports absolute verity, is to say nothing. A true
record not only imports absolute verity, but is what it imports to
be, absolute verity. Should the record fail to exhibit the fact "that
from the sudden illness of a juror, the case was tried by eleven,"
then the record would suppress the truth, and would cease to be
what it imports, viz: absolute verity. An honest record, like an
honest witness, must tell the whole truth. The record either was
or is untrue, or incomplete. It first exhibits twelve jurors were
sworn; that is true. It afterwards exhibits that the verdict was
rendered by eleven jurors; this is true also. There can be no
record of an event until the event transpires. Nor can the absence
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of a juror be matter of record before it was a fact. Nor could
there be a record of a verdict rendered by eleven jurors, until after
'At was rendered. A record of a court, like any other historical
detail, or narrative of facts as they occur, is chronological. An
incomplete record is, as it imports to be, absolute verity, as far as
it goes, but it is incomplete. When completed the record is perfect.
But if a record is let be and remain incomplete, it is not verity.
To omit in this record the fact that the verdict was rendered by
eleven jurors, would be a suppression of the truth and a suggestion
of falsehhood both at once. The record itself would suggest and
suppress. It would suggest that twelve jurors render the verdict,
as it shows that twelve were sworn; it would suppress that eleven
render it, &c. But I will pursue no further.
These remarks show how careful courts must be of entries on
their records. It was the duty of the court to note the fact of
record, and it is so recorded.
The question here is, "can the agreement of counsel dispense
with a juror in the trial of a criminal case, or can a lawful trial be
had with eleven jurors ?"

The sixth section of the ninth Article of the Constitution, is in
these words: "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right
thereof remain inviolate."
This provision is in the bill of rights. The word inviolate is a
very unusual word occurring in a written constitution. It clearly
denotes anxiety and jealousy in its framers. Inviolate means unhurt, uninjured, unprofaned; inviolable means unsusceptible of
hurt.
When the framers of the Constitution say "trial by jury shall
remain as heretofore," nothing can be plainer, for that was well
known; but they add the solemn mandate that "the right thereof
shall remain inviolate," and, however well they must have known
that courts and legislatures might, through ignorance, or accident,
or inadvertence or haste, adjudicate or enact uniconstitutionally in
other cases, they seemed determined that here there should be no
mistake.
The framers of the constitution were perfectly familiar with the
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judicial history of England, and the trial by jury there and elsewhere. They knew that this mode of trial was coeval with the first
civil government of that country. They well knew that its establishment and use in that island was always so highly valued and
esteemed by the people that no conquest, no change of government,
could prevail upon them to abolish it; and that in the Magna
Charta it was insisted on as the principal bulwark of their liberties.
They knew that Rome, Sparta and Carthage had lost their liberties,
but they knew also that these empires were strangers to the right
of trial by jury when their liberties were lost. They knew that
this mode of trial sprung up under and outlived the feudal despotism of the Plantagenets; that it survived the iron rule of the house
of Tudor and the house of Stuart; and that in 1790, the date of
the constitution, it flourished in full vigor, as it flourishes still.
I make this cursory allusion for the purpose of suggesting how
natural it was that the framers of the constitution, in the provisions
in the bill of rights, might well be jealous, peremptory, and emphatic.
Blackstone and other legal writers, call the right of trial by jury
a sacred right. The trial by jury means trial by the country.
Blackstone and all writers, antecedent and since, define a verdict to
be "the unanimous decision of a jury."
I shall now refer to authorities:
If a juror be taken ill during the progress of a trial, either in
felony or misdemeanor, the proceedings are at once interrupted.
If there be no reasonable probability of the juror's early return to
his duty, the remaining eleven should be discharged. The clerk of
the Crown shall make an entry of the fact, with the reason of it,
and the trial must be then recommenced, either at the same or a
subsequent assizes. Bex vs. Williams, Russell & Ryan's Crown
Cases, p. 224; 2 Hays' Dig. Cr. Law, p. 451.
The petit jury must consist precisely of twelve, and is never to
be more or less, and this fact it is necessary to insert upon the
record. If, therefore, the number returned be less than twelve, any
verdict must be ineffectual and the judgment will be reversed on
error. I Chitty's Cr. Law, p. 505.
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Twelve jurors must appear on the record to have rendered their
verdict, otherwise it is error. Rex vs. S. Michaels, 2 Blackstone, 719.
If only eleven jurors be sworn by mistake, no verdict can be
taken of the eleven, and if it be, it is error. 2 Hale's Pleas of the
Crown, p. 296.
Clyncard was convicted. It did not appear from the record that
the number of jurors was twelve. The court said it must appear,
for if the verdict were presented by a lesser number, it was clearly
ill, therefore judgment reversed. Croke Elizabeth, p. 654.
If a juror be sick so that he cannot deliberate, and a verdict be
taken, it is the verdict of the other eleven, and will be set aside.
Den vs. Baldwin, 2 Pennington, 945.
A jury must consist of twelve men; no other number is known
to the law. Dixon vs. Richards, 2 How. 771; 6 Blashford, 461;
22 Ohio, 296.
In case of a trial by a petit jury, it can be no more nor less than
twelve, and all assenting to the verdict. Accordingly, it was adjudged the judgment be reversed, because but eleven indictors.
2 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, p. 161.
Judgment was reversed, where it appeared the case had been tried
by thirteen jurors. Whitemarsh vs. Davis, 2 Haywood, p. 113;
Whar. C. Law, 326, 4th ed. ; State vs. Ford, 1 Cas. Law Rep. 510.
The legislature cannot constitutionally impose any provisions restrictive of the right of trial by jury. -Emerick vs. Earris,1 Binney, 424.
The trial by jury shall be as heretofore ; that is, in all civil and
criminal cases in court. The right of trial by jury, especially in
criminal cases, must be preserved inviolate, and it is error if it
does not appear by the record of a trial of an indictment, that the
defendant was tried by twelve jurors lawfully sworn. Doebler vs.
Com., 3 S. & R., 237.
Where a juror, after having been sworn, fails to appear, the court
should either compel his attendance or dismiss the jury and empannel another jury to try the case. Pennell vs. Perceval, 1 Harris,
201.
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A jury after being impanneled and sworn, were, by consent of
prisoner's counsel, allowed to separate. On that account, alone,
judgment was reversed. The court treated the consent as a nullity.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has uniformly reversed, even
in civil cases, where it appeared the verdict was rendered by eleven
jurors, or where it appeared that thirteen jurors were sworn.
The compulsory arbitration law of this State was by some deemed
unconstitutional, and so it would have been had there been no provision for an appeal which secured the right of trial by jury. This
law only applies to civil cases.
In a recent case in New York, at request of prisoner's counsel,
a juror was permitted to withdraw, and the facts were reduced to
writing and entered on record. The prisoner was convicted, the
record of the court below exhibiting that he was tried by twelve or
eleven jurorm. The case was taken up on error, and the Court of
Appeal reversed the judgment. The people vs. Michael Cancemi,
Dot yet reported. The juror withdrew at the suggestion and wish
of the prisoner and his counsel in writing.
Whatever may be the magic of the number twelve, as legal antiquarians have endeavored to trace it, its unanimity seems always to
have been required in criminal cases, although not so certainly settled in questions of property, until the reign of Edward the Third.
2 Reeves' History of the English Law, 270.
Public interests cannot be waived; private rights may. The
Constitution of New York permits a waiver in civil cases, for that
concerns private interest, but it suffers no consent in criminal cases.
The Constitution of Pennsylvania does not permit it eitber'in civil
or criminal cases. No consent can alter or modify the known, certain, uniform, permanent prescribed rules of trial in criminal cases.
To try with eleven or thirteen jurors is to create a new tribunal,
unknown to the constitution or law. This no counsel, or citizen, or
court, or all three, can do.
"Article 9, section 9, of the constitution, is in these words: "No
one can be deprived of life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land."
The foregoing authorities demonstrate that a trial by eleven
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jurors, although by consent and at the request of a prisoner, is not
"by the law of the land," but contrary to the law of the land.
Criminal prosecutions involve public wrongs, a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community,
considered as a community, in its social and aggregate capacity.
A man may do what he pleases with that which is his own, but in a
government no man's liberty or life is exclusively his own; the
commonwealth has an interest in both, and disdains to abridge the
one or forfeit the other, except in the precise manner and form she
herself has prescribed and pointed out.
Some of the cases referred to were felonies, some misdemeanors,
and some civil cases. The rule applies to all three classes, but more
especially to criminal cases. I can find no criminal case tried by
eleven jurors but what has been reversed; nor civil case in Pennsylvania but what has been reversed. I have by no means exhausted the authorities, but chosen those, omitting some, which are
respected and acquiesced in by the profession. The cases ruled in
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, whose authority is binding and
absolute, decide this motion independent of other reference.
If one juror can be dispensed with, or one juror added, then no
reason can be given why any number may not be dispensed with or
any number added. The law allows no addition or subtraction, nor
any other number than the number twelve.
From the foregoing authorities the following propositions, among
others, are self-evident.
1. When a juror withdraws from the trial, the fact must be noted
of record.
2. The record must show that twelve jurors were sworn. If it
appear that less or more than twelve delivered the verdict, it is
error.
8. Waiver by consent of a prisoner in a criminal case, is a
nullity.
In this case twelve jurors were sworn, and eleven delivered the
verdict. Judgment arrested, and the prisoner remanded for trial.'
'We are indebted to the Pittsburg Legal Journal for this case.-ds. A. L. Reg.

